An American Invasion of the Ottoman Empire?
As I was pouring through a few primary sources on Ottoman history, I discovered something rather peculiar. Off in a lonely corner of the Internet was a digital copy of a work entitled The Rights of American Citizens in Turkey dated to 1896. This is an interesting era of Ottoman history. We are approaching the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, an era defined by weakness and the disintegration of Ottoman power. Dubbed the “sick man of Europe,” the Ottoman Empire’s relationships with its European neighbors had radically shifted. Where once the Ottoman Empire was the dominant geopolitical force in the region, it was now facing massive foreign debts and internal strife. In the coming years, the Young Turks would emerge as a political force and radically push the Ottomans into the fiery hells of World War I.
Beyond these points, the contents of this source highlight something that I personally never considered: the bilateral relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the United States of America. Throughout American public education, there is almost no discussion on the United States and its relationship with the early modern Middle East as opposed to America’s current relationship to the region. In fact, most mainstream narratives seem to describe the Ottomans and America as completely separate entities, with no lines of connection or relationship. As I dug deeper into this source, it became apparent that such perspectives were wrong. In fact, a large part of this source dives into political initiatives conducted by several U.S. presidents and how they specifically fostered a bilateral relationship with the Ottoman Empire.
So, I want to take a moment to dissect this source in more detail, because what it offers to us is an incredible glimpse into the Ottoman Empire during its time of crisis from a unique vantage point. It's an amazing window into an American state that was just beginning to wake up from an isolationist slumber that would fully emerge in light of World War I. Furthermore, it informs us on how Americans viewed the Ottoman Empire in its final days. Even more intriguing is the relationship between America and the Ottoman Empire’s Armenian population. What we can glimpse from this source is a refutation of normative ideas presented in public education. Rather than both nations having zero contact with one another, what we can see is a number of political developments involving both countries. Through this source, we can understand just how cognizant the United States and the Ottomans were of one another.
An American intervention in the Ottoman state?!
So let’s first dive into the contents of this source and then we’ll explore the broader context and implications. The Rights of American Citizens in Turkey was an address presented by lawyer Everett P. Wheeler at the National Armenian Relief Committee. Delivered in New York City in 1896, the speech was recorded down and later presented in book form.
American citizens had over the years purchased real estate in the Ottoman Empire and there had been legal confusion as to whether such citizens should be tried under Ottoman or American jurisdiction. Everett P. Wheeler, a lawyer and legal scholar, argued that all American citizens “should be tried, in case of criminal charges, by their own Minister of Consul.”1 This whole document expands on this singular principle, with Wheeler arguing that “the necessary conclusion from what has been stated is that by capitulations, treaties, and usages extending back to the very beginning of the present Turkish Empire, the rights of foreigners in Turkey have been, with the full consent of the Turkish Government, placed on an entirely different footing from that upon which they rest in civilized countries.” As such, “the Turks would have no more right to expel the professors and students from the American College near Constantinople than the city of New York would have to expel the clerks from the Post Office building.”
When asked to provide examples of infringement of the above points, Wheeler explains that American citizens “have been arrested, deprived of their liberty, and driven from their homes without a trial… They have been attacked by mobs, their houses and property have been destroyed, and their lives put in most imminent peril. Our flag has been torn down and trampled under foot.” Wheeler puts the blame squarely on the Ottoman state, arguing that “the palace itself is ‘the source and type of all that is most ignorant, corrupt, and capriciously despotic.’”
With such points in mind, what then does Wheeler urge the American government to do in response? Wheeler poses this exact question rhetorically, wondering “what now becomes our duty?” As an answer, he explains that “the remedy for a self-respecting Government is… to send to the offending country an armed force sufficient to compel not only redress for the past but security for the future.” However, if anyone was afraid the United States would engage in a reckless act of adventurism and regime change, one need not worry. Wheeler believes that “no attempt would be made to bombard Turkish towns or destroy Turkish property... When order is restored in any place, all who live in that place are benefited by it.”
The American intervention being sold by Wheeler sounds almost altruistic, and throughout the text one might glean a colonial or even Orientalist dimension to Wheeler’s words. It’s clear that Wheeler doesn’t regard Ottoman citizens highly, stating that “the average Turk may be a fanatic.” Indeed, Wheeler asserts that “Americans are no menace to [the Turkish citizen’s] religion. Our troops would not plunder mosques, nor kill Mollahs, but would respect the Mohammedan religion, as we ask them to respect ours.”
In this light, Wheeler almost sounds like an early hawk advocating for an American occupation of Istanbul. It’s outrageous and incredulous, but a point not actually dissimilar to other ideas presented by him. So who exactly was Everett P. Wheeler?
Wheeler was an American lawyer who lived from 1840 to 1925. He graduated from rather prestigious institutions, including Harvard University, and would later play a role in founding the American Bar Association. His own political positions are rather controversial. He opposed women’s suffrage and led organizations like the Men’s Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage.2 Just like we’ve seen in his piece on the Ottoman Empire, Wheeler was caustic to his opponents. In one newsletter, he called supporters of women’s suffrage fanatics, and argued that “as a rule, fanatics have no sense of proportion and therefore no appreciation of the truth.”3
His view of women as a whole is just as colorful. In this same newsletter, he argues that “women are often tempters to sexual sin and delight in it.” Wheeler builds on this point with personal anecdotes and complaints that sound eerily similar to remarks given by modern misogynists. He ends his piece by asserting that “the proposition to give [women] votes is monstrous… Call a spade a spade. The facts are on our side. The good women in the suffragist ranks ignore or forget. Recognize their good intentions and enlighten their ignorance.” This context helps us understand just a little bit more about the author of The Rights of American Citizens in Turkey. We can perhaps take his remarks with a grain of salt.
However, if we ignore the bombastic declarations of war and occupation, I think there is something very important to note about Wheeler’s address. Although it’s tempting to view this document as further evidence of western imperialist designs and a desire of furthering Euro-American extralegal rights, I actually think an assessment of the historical context might change our analysis of this text. What we’ll see is that there is a confluence of several seemingly unrelated factors: the American-Ottoman bilateral relationship, the European context in the era of Ottoman decline, and the emergence of anti-Armenian sentiments in the empire.
As such, let’s first take a look at the relationship between the Ottoman state and the United States of America. In The Rights of American Citizens in Turkey, Wheeler does take the opportunity to dive into specific legal examples to at least offer some legitimacy to his points on American extrajudiciality in the Ottoman Empire. He references back to the words three American Secretaries of State and directly cites literature from previous judges to establish precedent to his suggestions.4 He even goes back to Ottoman treaties and laws to create a case against the Sultanate. For instance, Wheeler claims that “the Treaty of 1862 extended to American citizens the rights of citizens of the most favored nations,” and later on he explains that “the wrongs which have been committed upon our citizens in Turkey are a distinct and absolute violation of Turkish law.”
American Turkey, but the geographic kind.
One of Wheeler’s more interesting connections comes later on in the address, right where he’s talking about the possibilities of an American military intervention. Using American troops, Wheeler explains, “is what President Grant did in 1876, when our citizens in Salonica were threatened by a mob.” This I found perplexing. The presidency of Ulysses S. Grant is often noted for heightened corruption, kickbacks, and nepotism. Many historians often focus on the difficulties of Reconstruction. Never had I heard about President Grant being involved in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, but here we have a document that directly addresses such a situation.
When I dug deeper, it became clear that the American presence in the Ottoman Empire was more pervasive than expected. On October 29, 1874, President Grant gave a proclamation directed to the Ottoman government. Echoing Wheeler’s sentiments from 20 years later, Grant urged “His Imperial Majesty the Sultan… to sign the protocol which follows: the law granting foreigners the right of holding real estate does not interfere with the immunities specified by the treaties, and which will continue to protect the person and the movable property of foreigners who may become owners of real estate.”5
This protocol made it clear that such immunities extended even to residential homes. Should a consul exist within a nine-hour journey of the residence, Ottoman “agents of the public force can not enter the residence of a foreigner without the assistance of a consul.” For situations where an American citizen was outside of the nine-hour time period, local authorities could enter the home, “but only in case of urgency and for the search and proof of the crime of murder” and several other severe crimes. However, Grant asserted that a number of other Ottoman officials would need to be involved in order to legitimize this intrusion of American extrajudicial rights. When Ottoman officials did charge American citizens with a crime, Grant required the Ottomans to transfer the individual to “the nearest consular agent without delay,” thereby removing criminal jurisdiction away from Ottoman hands and toward American ones.
Within the protocol, President Grant referred back to a law developed in 1867 on American rights to hold real estate in the Ottoman Empire. Developed under the auspices of President Andrew Johnson and Secretary of State William Seward, we can see how Americans viewed the Ottoman Empire in this time. A letter sent to Seward from the American legation in Constantinople dated to June 25, 1867 explains that “it is to be regretted that the venality and incapacity of Turkish courts of justice is such as to render them generally unreliable as guardians of private rights.”6 The 1867 law would allow “the person and domicile… of the foreigner [to] continue to enjoy the immunities guaranteed by the capitulations and treaties.”
Considerations, concessions, and capitulations.
Throughout this discussion, we’ve talked about capitulations and various treaties. President Johnson, President Grant, and Wheeler have all mentioned these terms as being the basis for American extrajudiciality in Ottoman affairs, but we haven’t explored these in much detail yet.
Throughout the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire witnessed a series of military defeats that destroyed the Ottoman hegemony. An early example is the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, which forced the Ottomans to recognize the Austrian claim of a protectorate over Catholics in the Ottoman Empire.7 After that, the Russo-Turkish War from 1768-1774 devastated the Ottoman position as a world power. The Russian Empire’s victory over the Ottomans would place them as a preeminent player and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca forced the Ottomans to agree to a number of concessions. This treaty also enabled the Russian Empire to claim itself as the protector of Orthodox Christianity and that the Ottomans could not infringe on the rights of such Christians residing in the empire.8
The implications of these treaties would emerge in the 19th century. Nationalism and internal dissent began to unravel the country as the Serbs erupted into revolt in 1804 and the Greeks of the First Hellenic Republic declared independence in 1821. Meanwhile, the Auspicious Incident of 1826 resulted in the dissolution of the once renowned Janissary corps, but not before a revolt broke out leading to the deaths of thousands. Shortly after, war erupted leaving the Ottomans with an untested military in the midst of reform. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 saw the Russian Empire decisively defeat the Ottomans, and the resulting Treaty of Adrianople stipulated that Russian merchants were under the direct legal suzerainty of not the Ottomans, but of the Russian ambassador.9
More and more subject states in the Ottoman Empire began to fight for independence as the sentiments of nationalism spread. Fearing further decline and the realistic end to the empire, Sultan Abdülmecit I instituted a sweeping set of reforms that would be famously referred to as Tanzimat. The Tanzimat era of the Ottoman Empire saw a number of modernization efforts and reforms become implemented, such as the decriminalization of homosexuality, the development of a nationality law, and major economic reforms.10 Attempts were made at placating the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman state. The devshirme policy was ended, the slave trade was outlawed, and the Ottomans enacted the Reform Edict of 1856, which sought to equalize opportunity and education for both Muslims and non-Muslims within the Empire.
Despite these attempts at reform, the Crimean War of 1853-1856 would highlight the structural weaknesses that plagued the Ottoman state. In the days leading up to the conflict, great power competition between Russia and France resulted in Russia declaring that all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire were subjects under Russian legal jurisdiction. As the protector of Orthodox Christianity, the Russian Empire had the casus belli to do as it needed to protect its fellow Christians. In the end, Russia was defeated and lost its claims toward the entire Orthodox Christian population, but now nationalist sentiments were growing even faster within the Ottoman Empire.11
Although Russia had lost its claims on the Orthodox, other European powers still benefited from Ottoman capitulations, which granted European powers extrajudicial jurisdiction over its citizens. European merchants were essentially exempt from Ottoman laws and this not only resulted in legal issues but also problems with trade, as European merchants could monopolize trade flows in various ports like Beirut. These capitulations emerged early within the empire and were designed to encourage free trade. For instance, the Ottoman capitulation to Genoa in 1352 granted the Genoese freedom of passage and key tax privileges. A capitulation to France in 1569 led to similar policies being applied to French merchants and missionaries.12
The 1700s and 1800s saw radical shifts in Ottoman capitulations as Ottoman power waned and European power climbed. The 1838 capitulation between the Ottomans and the British saw British merchants gain an extralegal status outside of Ottoman courts. As a whole, “the capitulations were turning into a system by which foreign residents were virtually outside the law.”
Europe was not alone in benefiting from these capitulations. The United States of America had also benefited from this series of forced concessions.13 It is in 1830 with the Ottoman capitulation to the United States where we see the basis for the points laid in President Grant’s 1874 proclamation and in Everett P. Wheeler’s fiery statements in his 1896 speech. Prior to the 1830 agreement, American citizens in the Ottoman Empire did have some extralegal protection via the British Empire. A potential arms deal between the Ottoman Empire and the presidency of Andrew Jackson would spark the impetus towards a capitulation agreement, in which President Jackson attempted to sell American naval vessels to Sultan Mahmut II. Although this particular deal failed to garner support in the Senate, the United States was able to secure a commercial agreement with the Ottomans that granted American citizens rights similar to that of other European foreigners operating in the Ottoman state.
We can see this specifically in the text of the capitulation. For instance, Article 1 asserts that “American merchants who shall come to the well defended countries and ports of the Sublime Porte, shall pay the same duties and other imposts, that are paid by the merchants of the most friendly Powers.”14 Article 4 meanwhile argues that “if litigations and disputes should arise between subjects of the Sublime Porte and citizens of the United States, the parties shall not be heard nor shall judgement be pronounced, unless the American Dragoman be present.” Article 4 also contains the most important aspect of this discussion, stating:
“Citizens of the United States of America, quietly pursuing their commerce, and not being charged or convicted, of any crime or offence, shall not be molested; even when they may have committed some serious offence, they shall not be arrested and put in prison, by the local authorities, but they shall be tried by their Minister of Consul, and punished according to their offence, following in this respect, the usage observed towards other Franks.”
While American merchants were active, it seems that missionaries were the largest American population residing in the Ottoman Empire. A particular point of emphasis for such missionaries was to work with Armenian groups and schools, and apparently “Americans took contact with Armenians; and conferred the citizenship to them as well as taking them under their protection.”15
The American-Armenian connection.
Suddenly, much of Wheeler’s arguments make contextual sense, and it becomes even more apparent as to why Wheeler was giving such a speech at the National Armenian Relief Committee. The Committee emerged as a result of the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896, where the Ottoman state killed over 300,000 individuals. The Young Turks had often talked about “solving” the Armenian issue, and their response was to engage in wholesale massacre of villages and towns.16 In the wake of European incursion into Ottoman affairs, there was widespread fear among government officials that Armenians were collaborators with the Russian Empire. Such concerns grew to hysteric heights following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.
It seems that American missionaries were rather cognizant of the political situation, and many attempted to give Armenians American citizenship in order to provide them legal protection from the Ottoman state via the 1830 American-Ottoman capitulation. American media certainly knew about what was transpiring in the Ottoman Empire in this time, with a New York Times article from September 1895 referring to the Hamidian massacres as an “Armenian Holocaust.”17 A number of American newspapers and foreign correspondents urged the Ottoman state to end its actions against the Armenian people. Groups like the American Red Cross and the aforementioned National Armenian Relief Committee sent funds and provided support to displaced Armenians, while various individuals and missionaries continued their attempts at granting American citizenship to Armenian populations.18
In light of the Hamidian massacres, President Grover Cleveland gave a speech on foreign affairs addressing just that on December 2, 1895. In a message delivered to the American Congress, President Cleveland asserted that while the events were concerning, “thus far no American lives of citizens have been sacrificed, [though] there can be no doubt that serious loss and destruction of mission property have resulted from riotous conflicts and outrageous attacks.”19 Rather than take any particular stance on the massacres, President Cleveland seemed to have taken the traditional stance of American isolationism, deferring to other nations. According to him, “several of the most powerful European powers have secured a right and have assumed a duty not only in behalf of their own citizens… but as agents of the Christian world.”
Conclusion
With this in mind, we’ve finally come full circle. As European powers gained greater political prowess over the Ottoman Empire, internal pressures forced the Ottoman state to infringe further on the rights of its minority groups. Despite the efforts of Tanzimat, various wars with major European powers brought on additional capitulations and new challenges. Independence movements and territorial annexation by powers like Russia led to an Ottoman Empire acting out of desperation and a little bit of insanity. Pogroms and attacks against Armenian populations became major political initiatives throughout the late 1800s, and particularly between 1894-1896.
The United States of America had benefited from these developments in the form of its own capitulation agreement in 1830. Further agreements were established in 1867 and later in 1874, with particular emphasis on the purchase of real estate in the empire by American citizens. Property prices had declined dramatically in the Ottoman Empire in this time, but it seems like the largest group of American citizens operating in Ottoman lands were Christian missionaries.20 Many of these missionaries sought to offer American citizenship to Armenian populations, and such efforts became especially key during the 1890s.
The legal precedents set by presidents Johnson and Grant meant that these Armenian citizens theoretically had the political right of American extrajudiciality, which would entitle them to legal protections under American law as opposed to Ottoman law. This included the realm of real estate, with President Grant’s own 1874 proclamation asserting that Ottoman officials could not forcefully enter the homes of an American citizen. Such a measure would have been of immense protection for Armenians under threat of Ottoman policy. However, it seems like later American presidents like President Cleveland turned a blind eye on such policies and dismissed these protections outright, saying that only property had been damaged.
This context seems to underscore the arguments Wheeler presented in his 1896 speech to the National Armenian Relief Committee. American citizens, likely a reference to Armenian Americans, were under threat from Ottoman mobs and attacks. When Wheeler claims that American citizens “have been arrested, deprived of their liberty, and driven from their homes without a trial,” it is almost certain that this is in reference to the Hamidian massacres.21 With President Cleveland claiming that no Americans had been killed in the massacres, this seems to contradict the thousands of Armenians that did have American citizenship. President Cleveland’s emphasis on property may very well have influenced Wheeler’s own emphasis on real estate. These attacks had destroyed the homes of Armenian Americans and as outlined in the legal precedents set forth by American, European, and even Ottoman policies, the United States did have an obligation to defend its Armenian American citizens. This may very well have been Wheeler’s main point when giving his address to the National Armenian Relief Committee.
While such an interpretation is still speculative, I think there’s a lot that we’re able to unpack from this. We’ve seen how the interplay between European-Ottoman relations affected the development of American-Ottoman ties. Rather than there being little communications or interactions between the two polities, there seems to be a wealth of interactions from both a political sphere and an individual space. Missionaries and humanitarian workers traveled to the Ottoman Empire and American treaties with the Ottomans emerged to protect such citizens. However, there is a dark side to this. Such connections meant that both the American political and media landscapes were well aware of the events that led up to the Armenian Genocide, and although some efforts were attempted to give aid to the Armenians, little would actually be enacted. As the Ottoman Empire furthered its relationship with Germany in the 20th century and entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, the United States would see the ramifications of its inaction.
Everett P. Wheeler, The Rights of American Citizens in Turkey (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1896).
"Men oppose suffrage,” The New York Times, September 27, 1913.
Everett P. Wheeler, The Case Against Woman Suffrage: A Manual for Speakers, Debaters, Lecturers, Writers, and Anyone Who Wants the Facts, (New York: The Man-Suffrage Association, 1915), 3.
Everett P. Wheeler, The Rights of American Citizens in Turkey, 7.
Ulysses S. Grant, “Proclamation 222—Foreign Ownership of Real Estate in the Ottoman Empire.”
“Document 6” in Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress.
History of the Eastern Question (H.M. Stationary Office: London, 1920), 9.
Viktorija Jakjimovska, “A shift in the Russo-Ottoman balance of power in the Black Sea region: The Treaty of Kuçuk Kainardji of 1774,” Oxford Public International Law.
History of the Eastern Question, 17, 68-69.
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 272.
History of the Eastern Question, 19-20.
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, 258, 274.
Berrin Akalin, “Ottoman-American Relations, Francis Hopkins Smith and Armenian Issue,” Journal of International Education and Leadership 1, no. 5.
Berrin Akalin, “Ottoman-American Relations, Francis Hopkins Smith and Armenian Issue,” 5
Ronald Grigor Suny, “The Hamidian Massacres, 1894-1897: Disinterring a Buried History,” Études Arméniennes Contemporaines 11, no. 11.
“Another Armenian Holocaust; Five Villages Burned, Five Thousand Persons Made Homeless, and Anti-Christians Organized,” New York Times, September 10, 1895.
Michael H. Hoffman, “A Humanitarian Mission in 1896 and Its Enduring Mark,” Surgeon’s Call 1, no. 20.
Grover Cleveland, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president, transmitted to Congress December 2, 1895 Part I 1895 (Washington D.C: Government Printing Press, 1896), XXXV.
Gürer Karagedikli and Ali Coşkun Tunçer, “House prices in the Ottoman Empire: evidence from eighteenth‐century Edirne,” The Economic History Review 1, no. 74.
Everett P. Wheeler, The Rights of American Citizens in Turkey, 18.